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THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE:
"RECENTLY MINTED;" BUT COUNTERFEIT
Steven H. Goldberg
The foci of this Article are the ill-advised creation of a government-speech doctrine in
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), and its potentialfor
substantial FirstAmendment mischief particularly with respect to the establishment of
religion. Createdout of whole cloth, with no regardfor precedent, and in a case that did
not even raise the issue ofgovernment speech, the doctrinepermits the government to speak
with viewpoint about controversial cultural issues upon which the government has no
constitutionalright to act. Asked tofind unconstitutionalthe refusal of a municipalitY to
allow a Summum religious monument-the Seven Aphorisms of Summun-in a public
park, the Court ignored the refusal and createda justiicationfor the muncipality's past
permission to allow a private pary to put a Jewish religious monument-the Ten
Commandments-in the same park This Article argues that by avoiding the traditional
public-forum analysis and making an end run around the establishment-of-religion
problem, the Court created a doctrine that allows the government to diminish the
marketplace of ideas. By creating a doctrine that allows the government to choose
between private speakers and endorse one idea to the detriment of another in an area
where it has no constitutionalpower to act, the Court has done substantialdamage to the
First Amendment.
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THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE:
"RECENTLY MINTED;" BUT COUNTERFEIT
Steven H. Goldberg'
"To date, our decisions relying on the recently minted government speech doctrine to
upholdgovernment action have beenfew and in my view, of doubtful merit."I
-PleasantGrove City v. Summum (Stevers, J, concurring)

I. INTRODUCTION
The law of free speech in the Supreme Court has been fairly described
as "notorious for its flagrantly proliferating and contradictory rules, its
profoundly chaotic collection of methods and theories."2 The First
Amendment, as it has been interpreted in Supreme Court cases, has little
relationship to the founders' original intent, meaning, or purpose; 3 and the
case results are hardly famous for their consistency. 4 The recent warning
that the Court will "turn 'free speech' doctrine into a jurisprudence of
labels"5 flatters the already existing conglomeration of labels by calling it
jurisprudence.
"Government speech" is a most recent and potentially dangerous
example of a label transformed into a doctrine. Mentioned only as an aside

*Pmfessor of Law, Pace Law School. My thanks to Professors Daniel Farber, Bridget Crawford, Bennett
Gershman, andJohn Humbach for encouragement and helpful comments on earlier drafis of this artide.
' Pleasant Gmve City v. Summum, 129 S. Cr. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens,J., concuning).
2 Robert Post, Symp=rion m Law in die Tnddh Cajy: Rawci&rg 71awy ad Dirme in Fnt Amendat
Jwisprdmc4 88 CALL REV. 2353,2355 (2000).
3 "Congress shall make no law" has suggested to many that the original meaning of the First Amendment,
asJustice Thomas has argued, was to protect the states against the new federal government interfering with their
established religions. S ag, Van Orden v. Peny, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93 (2005) (ThomasJ., concurring) ("This
case would be easy if the Court were willing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for addressing
Establishment Clause challenges, and return to the original meaning of the Clause. I have previously suggested
that the Clause's text and history 'resis[t] incorporation' against the States." (alteration in original)).
Cmpar Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003), with RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396
(1992) (opposite results in crs-buning cases); Core-Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997), with
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (finding the same New York law providing for public school special
education teachers in pamchial schools first unconstitutional and then constitutional); cwr Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 259 (1961), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Communist-party
seditious-speech cases).
5PlaumtCo, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (BreyerJ., concuning).
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in earlier cases,6 government speech was minted into a doctrine in the very
case in whichJustice Stevens made his observation about "doubtful merit."
As crafted by Justice Alito in his Pleasant Grove Ciy v. Summum opinion, the
government-speech doctrine carries the potential for government, as a
spokesperson for the private speech of some citizens, to dominate the
marketplace of ideas to the detriment of the viewpoint of other citizens.
The doctrine was minted as a response to a Tenth Circuit decision
invalidating Pleasant Grove, Utah's exclusion of a privately donated
religious monument-Summum's Seven Aphorisms-from a public park
already containing another privately donated religious monument:
Judaism's Ten Commandments.8 Using classic forum analysis, the Tenth
Circuit found Pleasant Grove's Pioneer Park to be a traditional public
forum.9 Applying strict scrutiny, it held that Pleasant Grove did not have a
compelling interest for excluding the Summum Aphorisms Monument. 0
Justice Alito rejected the traditional forum analysis that both lower courts,
though they reached different results, found to be a serviceable tool for
deciding what to do about permanent monuments proposed for or existing
on government-owned property." He replaced it with a governmentspeech doctrine, cobbled together from dicta in a short series of unrelated
cases. It might be argued fairly that the Pleasant Grove result is salutary, but
describing placement of the Ten Commandments in Pioneer Park as
government speech was neither necessary nor wise.
This Article contends that the Supreme Court's newly minted
government-speech doctrine is counterfeit, and if usable in free speech
issues beyond placing stone monuments in government parks, it will further
debase First Amendment jurisprudence. Part II examines the Pleasant Grove
Court's authorities and arguments for a government-speech doctrine and
contends that neither the doctrine nor its use is justified. Part III discusses
the disconnect between a government-speech doctrine and the various
theoretical underpinnings that scholars have offered or the Court has used
to explain its free speech decisions. Part IV shows why a governmentspeech doctrine is not needed to maintain monuments in public places and
argues that turning private speech into government speech is dangerous

6 See

7

id at 1139 (Stevens,J.,

mncuning)

isting cadier cases tnentioning govemment speech).

See id
See Sumum v. pleasant Gmwe City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047, 1057 (10th Cir. 2007), ne'd, 129 S. Ct. 1125

(2009).
9Id at 1050.
'oId at 1053.
" Imsat Gmwe, 129 S. C. at 129.
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alchemy. Part V addresses the "elephant in the room"-the Ten
Commandments and government facilitated public religiosity. The Article
then briefly concludes.
II. "GOVERNMENT SPEECH" WAS MINTED ON Rus7{Y] METAL
PleasantGrove should never have been a government-speech case. There
was no government speech, only government censorship; an act almost
always prohibited by the First Amendment. Pleasant Grove, Utah refused
to allow the adherents to the Summum religion, headquartered in Salt Lake
City, Utah, to erect a monument containing their "Seven Aphorisms of
SUMMUM" in a public park that contained other monuments, including a
monument ofJudaism's Ten Commandments.12
Justice Alito's opinion starts by seeming to recognize that the issue is
Pleasant Grove's refusal to allow Summum's speech in Pioneer Park: "This
case presents the question whether the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment entitles a private group to insist that a municipality permit it to
place a permanent monument in a city park in which other donated
monuments were previously erected." 3 But rather than answer that
censorship question, he begins his analysis with a bit of judicial sleight of
hand that puts the government-speech rabbit into the hat of his decision.
He opens the analysis portion of the opinion by observing that "[n]o prior
decision of this Court has addressed the application of the Free Speech
Clause to a government entity's acceptance of privately donated, permanent
monuments for installation in a public park,"1 4 and he claims that the
parties disagree about the "line of precedents that governs this situation." 5
He dismisses the forum-analysis approach without any explanation of its
inapplicability and frames the issue in the case as "the nature of [Pleasant
Grove's] conduct when they permitted privately donated monuments to be
erected in Pioneer Park."' 6 Having taken Pleasant Grove's refusal to allow
the Summum monument in Pioneer Park out of the case, the opinion asks,
"Were petitioners engaging in their own expressive conduct? Or were they
providing a forum for private speech?"; 7 and then he takes the First
Amendment out of the case by observing that "[i]f petitioners were

"Id at 1129-30.
13ld at 1129.

1 Id at 1131 (emphasis added).
5 Id (describing that Summum argued private-speech-in-public-founn cases were applicable and that
Pleasant Grove argued that the pertinent cases were government-speech cases).

16Id
17Id
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engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has
no application."18
The issue switch that allows Pleasant Grove to censor Summum's
speech and keep its monument out of the park by cloaking it in a
government-speech doctrine does far more damage than the mere
manipulation of one case. It was once "axiomatic that the government may
not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys."' 9
Content-based government regulation of speech is
presumptively unconstitutional, 20 and viewpoint discrimination is the most
egregious content-based regulation. 21 Before the Pleasant Grove decision,
there was no government-speech doctrine of consequence, certainly none
that would allow a city to permit one kind of speech but not another in a
public park, or worse, one view about a subject but not another.
Justice Alito avoids the normal consequence of the city's viewpoint
discrimination-that it would be held unconstitutional-by creating a
government-speech doctrine out of whole cloth: .'[T]he Government's own
speech ... is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.'. .. A government

entity has the right to 'speak for itself.' It is entitled to say what it wishes,
and to select the views that it wants to express." 22 He weaves his tapestry
from some concurring opinion musings about government speech and some
narrow decisions of doubtful precedential value concerning government
spending and government programs, 23 none of which come close to
allowing the government to engage in the kind of viewpoint discrimination
involved when Pleasant Grove refused to allow Summum's aphorisms
monument to be placed in a public park where it had allowed Judaism's
Ten Commandments monument.
A. Rust

Rust v. Sullivan,24 Justice Alito's core authority for his viewpointdiscriminating government-speech doctrine, does not involve and does not
purport to be about a government-speech doctrine that would justify
Pleasant Grove's granting permission to place the Ten Commandments in

18Id
'9 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (citing Police Dep't of
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,96 (1972)).
2o RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
21
SRsmberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing various cases).
22
Pimsm Groe, 129 S. Ct at 1131 (citations omitted).
23 S, id
24

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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Pioneer Park. Rust was about a government-funded family-planning
program.25 Its author, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, went out of his way to say
that the case was not about speech and most definitely not about
viewpoint. 26
At issue were the 1988 Department of Health and Human Services
regulations to Title X of the 1970 Public Health Service Act.27 Established
three years before Roe v. Wade,28 the Act excluded funding for "programs
where abortion was a method of family planning."29 Fifteen years after Roe,
the 1988 Reagan administration regulations were promulgated to clarify the
definition of "family planning" and to ensure that federal funds were "to be
used only to support preventive family planning services." 30 Hospitals that
received Tide X funds and the doctors that worked in them made a facial
challenge, claiming that the regulations were not authorized by Tide X;
violated constitutional rights of the women who were Title X clients; and
violated the First Amendment rights of Title X providers.3'
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the Rust opinion by emphasizing the
petitioners' heavy burden in sustaining such a facial challenge: "The fact
that [the regulations] might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render [them] wholly
invalid."32
The doctors claimed that the regulations violated their free speech
rights by imposing "viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on government
subsidies."33 Acknowledging that the government could place conditions on
the receipt of federal subsidies, they argued that the government could not
"discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in a way as to 'aim at the
suppression of dangerous ideas.'" 34 The Court rejected the argument by
emphasizing that the issue in the case was about funding a government
program and that there was no First Amendment viewpoint discrimination
issue:

5

Id at 178.

26 d at 174-75.

SId at 178.
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9
Rust 500 U.S. at 178.
3 Id at 179.
A Id at 181.
3 Id at 183 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
ss Id at 192.
4 Id (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)) (ntemal quotation marks
omitted).
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The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund
a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other....
. . *This is not a case of the Government "suppressing a dangerous
idea," but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from
35
engaging in activities outside of the project's scope.
The Rust decision, as it relates to government programs, has been
distinguished more than it has been followed, but it has had no life at all as a
case establishing a government-speech doctrine, let alone one allowing for
viewpoint discrimination. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 36 decided a decade
after Rust, seemed to be the same case, but in lawyer's clothing. Legal
Services' lawyers claimed that conditions imposed by Congress on the use of
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funds "violate[d] the First Amendment
rights of LSC grantees and their clients."37 The majority acknowledged that
the Rust Court "did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to
governmental speech."3 8 Concerned, however, with some post-Rust funding
cases that appeared to distinguish Rust on the basis that the government was
the speaker,39 the Legal Services majority avoided the Rust result with its own
distinction between doctors and lawyers: "The advice from the attorney to
the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified
as governmental speech even under a generous understanding of the
concept. In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable from Rust."4

at 193-94.
I6gal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
31Id at 536.
5Id at 541.
9
See id at 541-42 ("We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in
which the government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust in which the government 'used private speakers
to transmit specific information pertaining to its own pmgram.' As we said in Rszber, 'when the government
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appupriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.' The latitude which
may exist for restrictions on speech where the govermment's own message is being delivered flows in part from our
observation that, 'when the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a
particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the
citizensy objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position."' (citations
omitted)).
4 Id at 542-43.
3Id
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The idea that restricting doctor counseling of patients was constitutional
because it was government speech, but restricting lawyer counseling of
clients was unconstitutional because it was not government speech, must
have struck doctors as a distinction only a lawyer could love. It certainly
struck Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Rust, that
way. Writing for the four Legal Services dissenters, Justice Scalia all but
laughed out loud at the majority's distinction and dismissed out of hand the
notion that Rust was about speech:
The Court contends that Rust is different because the program at issue
subsidized government speech, while the LSC funds private speech. This
is so unpersuasive it hardly needs response. If the private doctors'
confidential advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted
"government speech," it is hard to imagine what subsidized speech would
not be government speech. . . . Even respondents agree that "the true
4
speaker in Rust was not the government, but a doctor."*

Decided during the Rehnquist Court's retreat from earlier post-Roe
decisions nullifying state laws that burdened a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy, Rust is one of those abortion cases rarely cited and never used by
the Court as precedent supporting a decision in any other context-at least
not until Pleasant Grove.
B. Other Corrosions
If Rust did not create a government-speech doctrine that allows for
viewpoint discrimination, Justice Alito's other Pleasant Grove authorities are
even less supportive. Not one of the citations represented a holding. None
involved the government saying "no" to speech based on content, let alone
viewpoint. And none was even close to considering the government as a
decider of what speech was appropriate. Most dealt with government
subsidies and the non-existence of a taxpayer's "heckler's veto."
The Pleasant Grove core idea-"Government is not restrained by the
First Amendment from controlling its own expression" 42-is an aside in a
footnote from Justice Stewart's concurrence in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee.43 Ironically, Justice Stewart offered the aside to support the
proposition that the government had no power to silence speakers based on
the content of their speech: "Since when has the First Amendment given

Id at 554 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
42Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
" See CBS v. Democratic Nat Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (StewartJ., concuning).
4
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Government the right to silence all speakers it does not consider
'responsible?"' 44
The CBS case, decided almost two decades before Rust and three
decades before Pleasant Grove, had absolutely nothing to do with the idea that
government speech was free of the First Amendment. Rather, it was about
whether the FCC's Fairness Doctrine4 5 required CBS to accept an editorial
advertisement of the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace.46 The
business executives' organization argued that the effect of the Fairness
Doctrine was to put CBS in the shoes of the government regarding political
speech, prohibiting it from refusing the editorial advertisement. 47 Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concluded that a
broadcast licensee's refusal to accept a paid editorial advertisement did not
constitute "governmental action" for First Amendment purposes. 48
The Stewart quote from CBS about the government "controlling its own
expression," was in support of the proposition that "[t]he First Amendment
protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous
protection on the Government. To hold that broadcaster action is
governmental action would thus simply strip broadcasters of their own First
Amendment rights."4 9 It was an affirmation of the Executive's right to
classify government documents in the first instance. It had nothing to do
with the nature of government speech. The point that the Executive could
classify documents had nothing to do with the Court's decision, which
refused to restrain press publication of the Pentagon Papers.5 o Justice
Stewart's aside provides no support for the Pleasant Grove assertion that
"[g]overnment is not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling
its own expression." 5 1
Justice Alito's reliance on language from two university subsidy cases to
suggest a government-speech doctrine permitting viewpoint discrimination
is even less justified. Neither case involved government speech.

4 Id at 139.
5For a discussion of the history and development of the Fairness Doctrine, see id at I10-13 (majonty
opinion).
6 Id at 97.
4 See id at 114-15 ("IW]e next proceed to consider whether a broadcaster's refusal to accept editorial
advertisements is governmental action violative ofthe First Amendment.").
48Id at 121.
49Id at 139 (StewartJ., concuning) (footnote omitted).
0
- Se N.Y. Tunes Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (StewartJ., concurning).
5'Pleasant Grove Cityv. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
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Rosenberger v. Rector and Vsitors of University of Virginia,52 cited in Pleasant
Grove for the proposition that "[Government] is entitled to say what it
wishes," 53 neither says it nor implies it.54 Rosenberger was a hotly contested
five-to-four decision touching on both religion and subsidy. The university
refused to pay the third-party printer of a student organization newspaper
that had a Christian editorial viewpoint.55 It refused to use the university
fund established for such payments for fear that the payment would be
56
considered support of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Court decided that the fund was analogous to a limited public forum,
in which content discrimination was permissible and viewpoint
discrimination was not.57 A majority found the university had engaged in
viewpoint discrimination.58 The Rosenberger Court said specifically that the
issue of whether the government was entitled to say what it wishes was not
at issue in the case because there was no government speech.59 Ironically,
the Rosenberger Court suggested that had the government been the speaker, it
would not be allowed to express a viewpoint.60
Board of Regents of the University of Wsconsin Systern v. Southworth,6 1 cited for
62
the proposition that the government "has the right to 'speak for itself,"' is
equally inapposite. The Southworth Court goes out of its way to cite Rust as a
funding case that stands for the "general rule" that government "may
support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding
protesting parties," and then says specifically that "the issue of the
government's right . . . to use its own funds to advance a particular

message" is not raised in the case before

it:63

The University having disclaimed that the speech is its own, we do not
reach the question whether traditional political controls to ensure
responsible government action would be sufficient to overcome First
Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under the
principle that the government can speak for itself. If the challenged speech

v. Rector & Visitors ofthe Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
"Planadtao, 129S. Ct. at 1131 (citing Ranager, 515 U.S. at 833).
Se RosAeger, 515 U.S. at 833.
5Id at 827.
56Se id at 828.
5Id at 830-31.
58Id at 831-32.
Se id at 834.
5Rosenberger

61

62

(2000)).
63

Bd. ofRegents of the Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
Pleasant Grove City v. Surnmurn, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (citing Sulawrs, 529 U.S. at 229

Soutlarh,529 U.S. at 229.
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here were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials
were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the
premise that the government itself is the speaker. That is not the case
before us.64

Justice Alito cites National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,65 for the
proposition that government speech is free from any restriction regarding
viewpoint. 66 The language cited, "It is the very business of government to
favor and disfavor points of view," 67 was an idea the Court's majority was
specifically unwilling to agree to. The claim was made in Justice Scalia's
concurrence-a quarrel with the majority's unwillingness to take up the
viewpoint issue because the statute did not provide for government
viewpoint discrimination.
"The operation was a success, but the patient died." What such a
procedure is to medicine, the Court's opinion in this case is to law. It
sustains the constitutionality of 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) by gutting it. The
most avid congressional opponents of the provision could not have asked
for more. I write separately because, unlike the Court, I think that
§ 954(d)(1) must be evaluated as written, rather than as distorted by the
agency it was meant to control. By its terms, it establishes content- and
viewpoint-based criteria upon which grant applications are to be
evaluated. And that is perfectly constitutional. 68
The Pleasant Grove opinion's use of Justice Scalia's view distorts the real
meaning of National Endowmentfor the Arts and its majority's unwillingness to
acceptJustice Scalia's view.

Justice Alito's first claim in creating a government-speech doctrine that
allows viewpoint discrimination-that "[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech" 69-would be a First Amendment blockbuster if correct. The notion
that the government is constitutionally prohibited from using its power to

influence the social dialogue by picking and choosing among private
speakers, but is free to use its preemptive megaphone to dominate that
dialogue, is an astounding commentary on the purpose of, theory for, and

rAId
s5 Nat? Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
6 Plaant Grwe, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (citing Nat'1 Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scaia, J.
concurring)).
67NaflFalowmentforthe Arts 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia,J., concuing).
61Id at 590.
69IYsm Grove, 129 S. C. at 1131.
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operation of the First Amendment. The only support in the opinion for the
statement is a "see" citation to Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 70 a case
about whether something in the First Amendment might free a taxpayer
from paying a government compelled subsidy.71 Johanns had nothing to do
with whether the First Amendment might impose restrictions on the nature
of government speech.
The case was about the "Beef. It's What's for Dinner." ads. 72 The
government imposed a $1-per-head assessment on all cattle sales and used
the funds to create the ads, which were identified as coming from
"America's Beef Producers."73 Some beef producers objected to the ads
and challenged the assessment, citing United States v. United Foods, Inc.,74
which four years earlier had held that a similar assessment for mushroom
The district court found the
ads violated the First Amendment.75
assessment for beef ads violated the First Amendment in the same fashion as
the mushroom assessment had in United Foods.76 The Johanns Court agreed
with the district court conclusion that "the beef checkoff is, in all material
respects, identical to the mushroom checkoff,"77 but it distinguished United
Foods on the basis that there had been no claim that the mushroom ads were
government speech.78 Counsel in United Foods had stated that the speech
was private, so the Court found the compelled subsidy violated the First
Amendment rights of private individuals who did not want to support that
private activity.79 Counsel in Johanns, faced with the United Foods decision,
said that the speech was the government's, and because it was the
government speaking, the compelled subsidy did not violate the First
Amendment.80 On the way to holding that "respondents enjoy no right not
to fund government speech-whether by broad-based taxes or targeted
assessments,"81 Justice Scalia's opinion includes the dictum that the First
Amendment "does not regulate government speech."8 2 But that was not an
issue in the case.

7

oJohanns v. livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550,553 (2005).
7Sid.
72Sm id at 554.
7
Id at 554-55.

14 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
75
, gmeah id
76
Joarms,544 U.S. at 556.
7Id at 558.
78 Id

79

at 559 n.3.

S United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411.
soUJohams,544 U.S. at 560.
81 Id at 564 n.7.

82S id. at 553 ("[I]he Government's own speech ... is exempt fiom First Amendment scmtiny.").
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The only First Amendment issue in Johanns was whether government
speech is a "distinct category of expression that obliterates whatever First
Amendment interest persons may have in not being required to subsidize
the speech of others."8 3 Once the Johanns Court distinguished United Foods
by labeling the advertisement "government speech," 84 it only had to
determine whether the complaining beef producers had some kind of
"heckler's veto."8 5 To that, the Court said "no."8 6 Contrary to Justice
Scalia's dictum, the Johanns Court decided nothing about what restrictions
the First Amendment might place on the content of government speech; it
decided only that people taxed for speech they did not like could not avoid
the tax.87
Even though Pleasant Grove involved a government rejection of
Summum's private speech; involved no government speech whatsoever;
relied on odd snippets from Rust and other inapposite dicta; and offered no
First Amendment discussion, rationale, or justification for its sweeping
invention; it is likely to be viewed as firmly establishing that when the
government speaks, the First Amendment places no viewpoint restriction on
its speech.
Rust and Johanns, to the extent they involve speech, only involve speech
that facilitates constitutional government action. They have nothing to say
regarding government speech that is not being used to facilitate an
appropriate government action. The distinction is critical. Southworth,88
though it involved no government speech, contained dictum acknowledging
that government might speak as a part of appropriate government action:
The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and
policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within
this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the
government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and
defend its own policies.89

8 Sm Robert Post, Compeli Subsidaon ofSpeh.Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP.
Cr. REV. 195, 207.
4 SeeJoaw, 544 U.S. at 560; se also Gia B. Lee, Persuaon, Transparmc, and Govemmwt SpA, 56 HASTINGS
LJ. 983, 988-89 (2005) (discussing the absurdity of labeling the advertisement attributed to "America's Beef
Producers," paid for by beefproducers, and written by beefproducers as government speech).
8 SeeJoiams, 544 U.S. at 566.
86 See id at 564 n.7 ("As we hold today, respondents enjoy no right not to fimd govemment speechwhether by broad-based taxes or targeted assessments . ..
8 See id
8 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).

9 Id at 229.
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The Southworth Court then described the safety net that democracy provides
when the electorate does not approve of the lawmaking or the advocacy of
it: "[a government entity] is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and
the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected
officials later could espouse some different or contrary position."90 The
Southworth Court's hypothesized democratic control of government
lawmaking within areas of its constitutional competence provides nothing
for a minority offended by government's use of the Ten Commandments for
its religious or moral pronouncements that have nothing to do with the
government's function as the maker, interpreter, or facilitator of law.
IH. "GOVERNMENT SPEECH" FITS No FREE SPEECH THEORY

There is no agreement on a single value driving the First Amendment's
protection of expressive freedom, despite the best efforts of scholars and
judges to find one. John Stuart Mill was an early and important advocate of
expressive freedom; 9' Justice Holmes, in his famous Abrams v. United States
dissent,92 placed Mill's free speech value-the discovery of truth-firmly in
the foundation of the Court's free speech discussion: "[T]he best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market . . . ."
The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor is the most often articulated
justification in common parlance for the Free Speech Clause, but the
"search for the truth" ideal is only one of the oft cited affirmative values
underlying the Free Speech Clause.94 Professor Thomas Emerson, in his
influential article, Toward a General Theog of the FirstAmendment, argued that
the various affirmative values that were pursued when protecting speech
could be placed in four broad categories: participation in democratic
decision making; individual self-fulfillment; attaining the truth; and
maintaining a societal balance between stability and change.95 With
occasional additions, caveats, and minor quarrels, the four categories have
been the subject of extended debate among scholars about which of the

9 Id at 235.
" SograyJOHN STUART MIL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
9 Se Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[The ultimate good
desired is better reached by firee trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that tmuth is the only gmund upon which their wishes safely can
be canied out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.").
93Id
9'S* ag., ERWIN CHEmERINsKY, CONsTTuEONAL IAW: PRINCIPLES AND POucIEs 925-30 (3d ed.
2006) (discussing justifications and values underlying the Free Speech Clause).
5
9 Thomas 1.Emerson, Tarda Gowal 7hay ofde Fstt Amannm, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 878-79 (1963).
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values is the foundational value upon which free expression rests. Professors
Farber and Frickey, observing that the interminable debate has been
unavailing in creating agreement on a single First Amendment value,96
suggest that "[f]ree speech is a powerful idea precisely because it appeals to
so many diverse values."97
The Supreme Court has never put its imprimatur on a one-and-only
free speech theory, perhaps adopting the Farber-Frickey approach without
saying so, but not one of the affirmative free speech values supports a
government-speech doctrine.
"Participation in decision making" has been an important value for the
Court. While it has not gone so far as to adopt Professor Meiklejohn's view
that "the freedom of speech springs [only] from the necessities of the
program of self-government," 98 its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan99
supports Justice Black's claim that "freedom to discuss public affairs and
public officials is unquestionably, as the Court today holds, the kind of
speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the area
of free discussion." 00 Professor Kalven, commenting on New York Times,
finds the "central meaning of the First Amendment" in the
unconstitutionality of seditious libel.' 0 "[D]efamation of the government,"
he says, "is an impossible notion for a democracy." 0 2 In support of his
thesis, Professor Kalven points to the Court's use of Madison's observations
that the democratic process presents an inevitable and healthy tension
between the people and the government: "The people, not the government,
possess the absolute sovereignty. . . . If we advert to the nature of

Republican Government we shall find that the censorial power is in the
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people." 0 3

96Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, liactilRse and the First Amwadnmi, 34 UCIA L REV. 1615,
1640 (1987).
9 Id at 1642-43 ("Some people may support it because they are concerned about political censorship,
some because they are libertarians, some because they want vitality in the arts, some because it's the American
thing to do, maybe even [for] some . . . it's an exercise in tolerance.").
98

ALEXANDER MEIUJOHN, POIITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTTruTONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE

27(1960).
9 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1
0 Id at 296-97 (BlackJ., concurring).
01
' S Harry Kalven,Jr., 7he New York Tiner Cue-A Note on "The GralManing ofthe irstAmadnmt," 1964
SUP. Cr. REV. 191.
1o2Id at
03

N

205.
Tiner, 376 U.S. at 274-75 (internal quotation marks omitted).

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

36

[Vol. 49:21

The unfettered free expression-the advocacy-of office holders,
politicians, and citizens shapes the government and determines its lawmaking activity. Nothing in the First Amendment theory of "participation
in decision making" supports the notion that the government itself could be
a speaker in determining its own shape or the laws it should adopt. On the
contrary, the theory of democracy is that so long as government maintains
its role as the listener of political speech, it will reflect the will of the people
as expressed through their speech. It is the speech of the people, not the
speech of government qua government, that the Free Speech Clause
protects.
The "individual self-fulfillment" value would seem on its face to have
nothing to do with government speech. Self-realization, as Professor Redish
articulates the value, is about an individual's development in all aspects of
life.' 04 "There is more to self-realization, however, than private selfgovernment. For it is highly doubtful that fine art, ballet, or literature can
be thought to aid one in making concrete life-affecting decisions, yet all
three seem deserving of full first amendment protection." 05
Government is incapable of self-fulfillment in the sense that Professor
Redish describes. Government fulfillment comes from the laws that it
passes and its ability to respond effectively to the goals of the citizens. More
importantly, government viewpoint about what an individual should do,
believe, appreciate, abhor, or consider valuable in culture creates a subtle
pressure antithetical to the individual self-realization value.
"Attainment of truth" and "attaining a societal balance between
stability and change" are the free speech values that might be in the greatest
danger from a government-speech doctrine. For these values, unlike
"individual self-realization," where it is easy to understand that the
government is not an individual; and "participation in decision making,"
where the government is listener, not speaker; there is no obvious
disqualifier of the government as a speaker.
The problem with the government as a speaker in "attaining the truth"
or in "attaining a societal balance between stability and change" is one that
Professor Meiklejohn identifies when advocating that "participation in
decision making" is the foundational value underlying the First
Amendment. 06 He uses the traditional town meeting, which he describes

'-Martin H. Redish, The ValueofFSwyrA, 130 U. PA. L REV. 591,626-27 (1982).
1o Id at 627.

1o6MEIKUEjOHN, .wra note 98, at 24,42.
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as "self-government in its simplest, most obvious form," 0 7 as a metaphor for
In
the larger representative democracy of American government.
the
to
damage
the
including
of
speech,
of
freedom
role
explaining the key
decision-making process if "unwise ideas" are censored, he says: "It is that
mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First
Amendment to the Constitution is directed." 08 In seeking truth-a balance
between societal stability and change, or any of the affirmative free speech
values, for that matter-the government's ideas are not part of the
"thinking of the community." The whole idea of the First Amendment is to
keep the government's predilections from interfering with the discussion
that will create the various free speech benefits that theorists have identified.
It matters little for the usefulness of that free expression whether the
government restricts the ideas in the marketplace by censorship or by taking
up most of the space in the market. Government, with its power of taxes,
size, rule making, access to communication, and its information advantage
can be an outsized persuader. It can speak more often than others and, in a
democratic society, can appear to be speaking with the voice of the
majority, even if the particular speech is a minority view.
Professor Emerson, in discussing the value of free expression in
attaining societal balance between stability and change, observes that "[t]he
traditional doctrine of freedom of expression. . . embodies a theory of social
control.... [W]here men have learned how to function within the law, an
open society will be the stronger and more cohesive one."109 He warns,
however, that "suppression of discussion makes a rational judgment
impossible;" and that while a society might show a "superficial conformity"
it will ultimately substitute force for logic and will eventually disintegrate or
implode because of its inevitable "inflexibility and stultification.""10 The
difference between a government that controls its citizens through force of
arms and a government that controls its citizens through coercion of
thought is a slim reed upon which to build a free society.
Little needs to be said about the danger to the democratic decisionmaking process of a government that can dominate the political discussion
and thereby perpetuate itself America's representative government, in
contrast to professor Meiklejohn's traditional town meeting,' is a separate
entity from the people whose speech matters in creating or changing the

07

Id at 42.
at 27.
1o9 Emerson, .pra note 95, at 884.
1osId
Ilon

III

MEKLEJOH-N,.mra note 98, at 24.
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government or its laws. The Pleasant Grove government-speech doctrine
purports to enable a government entity's speech as such." 2 A government
entity that has a voice in creating itself carries the same evil that Madison
saw in one who "is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause."" 3
Just because the government should not be a speaker about its shape or
its laws does not mean that an office holder, a politician, or a political party
that happens to be in power is not a proper speaker. No governmentspeech doctrine is needed to enable individual viewpoint speech; the Free
Speech Clause ensures it without need of a special doctrine.
The First Amendment, at its core, is an anti-government idea.
Professors Cass and Blasi, each in his own way, identifies undue government
influence as the driving force behind the creation of the First Amendment.
Professor Cass, in suggesting a "negative" theory of the First Amendment,"'
observes that "[s]ubstantive constraints on federal power were not the
product of general beliefs in liberty, but of more focused fears about its
unjustified infringement."' '-1 Professor Blasi points to the history underlying
the First Amendment in arguing that the "checking value" of free speech on
government power was an important reason for the First Amendment:" 6
Thus, the colonial pamphleteers, like the opposition leaders in
England whom they so admired, organized much of their political thought
around the need they perceived to check the abuse of governmental
power. The First Amendment was an outgrowth of this body of thought,
as can be discerned from a brief examination of the most important
eighteenth-century American writings on freedom of speech and freedom

of the press." 7
The PleasantGrove approach to understanding the First Amendment and
justifying a government-speech doctrine is not a very effective way to glean
the meaning of the constitutional text. The opinion claims that the
government may express a viewpoint because the First Amendment has
nothing to say about the government as a speaker, it being concerned only
with the government as a suppressor or controller of citizen speech18 That
narrow understanding of the First Amendment ignores the reason the

M1
Se Pleasant Gmve City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131-32 (2009).
11 THE FEDERALST No. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
114See Ronald A. Cass, The Pi&of IPuid Thihrig andideal Intoepradm and Ngade Ft Amadnat
Thany, 34 UCILA L Rev. 1405, 1438-65 (1987).
"sd at 1440-41.
116
Vincent Blasi, The Orig Vaue in FJstAmodnnmi They, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 521,527-44.
7
Id at 533.
118Sm Pleasant Gmve City v. Sunmun, 129 S. C. 1125, 1131 (2009).
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Amendment was adopted-to protect individuals from government. It
blinks reality to ignore that government can suppress and control ideas
almost as easily by speaking as it can by refusing to allow others to speak. A
government-speech doctrine turns the idea of a democratic government on
its head when it allows the entity of government to advocate over its own
shape and its own laws. A government-speech doctrine that makes room
for the government to speak on issues over which it has no lawmaking
power is even more insidious because it invades the kind of individual
private thought and belief that the First Amendment exists to protect.
The danger of government viewpoint in areas over which it has no
lawmaking power is exemplified by the debate between former Justice
O'Conner and Justice Kennedy over how to determine whether a
government display of a religious idea violates the Establishment Clause.
The approach of each, in its own way, creates an unfortunate result. Justice
O'Connor claimed that if a government-sponsored religious display
appeared to be an endorsement of religion, it violated the Establishment
Clause." 9 Justice Kennedy rejected the approach and argued there would
be no violation of the Establishment Clause if the government merely
endorsed the religious idea; it had to coerce the citizenry to run afoul of the
First Amendment.120
Justice Kennedy's "coercion" approach, which has not been accepted
by a majority of the Court, would virtually ensure government-sponsored
religious displays and ceremonies. He claims that the avenue for objection
to government influence beyond its constitutional power to act exists when
those who might object are coerced.121 If they are coerced, however, they
are unlikely to object to the government influence. And if they are not
coerced, according to Justice Kennedy, the government has done nothing
wrong by its attempt to promote a majority religion.122 The idea that a
symbiotic relationship between government and majority religion violates
the First Amendment, only when it changes the shape of society by coercing
citizens, might be good for majority religionists. But the First Amendment
is about the rest of us.

"9 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-88, 690 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
0
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660, 662-63,670, 679 (1989) (KennedyJ., concuning in
part and disenting in part).
1 Se id at 660, 670.
"2 Said at 662-63, 679.
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Justice O'Connor's approach, which also has not replaced the
Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman,123 would prohibit
government from "endorsement" of religion. 124 The problem with her
approach is not in the theory, but in its application. In Lynch v. Donnelly,
O'Connor finds the government does not appear to be endorsing the
majority religion of Christianity when it sponsors a creche, so long as there
are plastic reindeer and a Santa Claus in the vicinity. 25 It reflects the
perspective of someone who has, as most judges have, never been on the
other side of the dominant culture. She might have had a different view
had she grown up Muslim, atheist, or as a schoolchild who felt apart when
her classmates celebrated Christmas in the classroom or sang carols in the
school auditorium. There is no doubt that she understands, in the abstract,
the danger of government dominance of the marketplace of ideas:
In the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special
status. Government religious expression therefore risks crowding out
private observance and distorting the natural interplay between competing
beliefs. Allowing government to be a potential mouthpiece for competing
religious ideas risks the sort of division that might easily spill over into
26
suppression of rival beliefs.'
The government-speech doctrine, in addition to not being supported by
any of the affirmative values attributed to free expression, is a hindrance to
those values. If the entity of government is a proper speaker in the political
debate, it will chill contrary citizen speech, monopolize the marketplace of
ideas, and not be able to fulfill its critical First Amendment role as listener.
It is even worse when the government speaks beyond its constitutional roles
as lawmaker, enforcer, or interpreter. Government's size and importance in
society makes it an enemy of the idea of the First Amendment when, as a
speaker, it is allowed to influence what we think, what entertains us, what
we celebrate, what makes us laugh, and what makes us cry.

12 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) C'First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not 'foster an excessive goverment entanglement with religion."' (citations onitted)).
4
Lych, 465 U.S. at 688,690,692 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
' S id at 692-93.
12 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,883 (2005) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
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IV. CHANGING PRIVATE SPEECH INTO "GOVERNMENT SPEECH" IS A
MONUMENT[AL] MISTAKE

Monuments in parks throughout the country were one of the concerns
that brought Pleasant Grove to the Court. Many cities and states wrote
amicus briefs, concerned that if Pleasant Grove had to allow the Seven
Aphorisms monument, they would have to accept any monument in any
park that contained other monuments.127 The problem might have been
one in need of a solution, but government speech was neither a necessary
nor an appropriate solution.
Forum analysis, used by both the district court and the Tenth Circuit,
has been the Court's main tool for calibrating the government's ability to
limit speech in government-owned areas. Under the tri-category approach
to forum analysis described in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n' 2 8 traditional public forum, designated public forum, and non-public
forum-the Court has, for more than a half-century, created a variety of
rules that have served to solve the myriad of problems regarding private
speech on publicly owned land.129 It would have worked for the monument
problem.
Forum analysis, as with most First Amendment analytic constructs, is
sufficiently flexible to reach whatever result the Court seeks in a particular
case. Pery's three fora are clearly described, but they mask an analytic
construct that can be manipulated to justify almost any result. In this case,
the district court found that exclusion of the Summum Aphorisms did not
violate the First Amendment because monuments in a public park constitute
a non-public forum in which reasonable content discrimination is permitted
but viewpoint discrimination is not.130 The district court identified the
historical significance to Pleasant Grove as the content and said that
Summum's recently developed Aphorisms did not fit the category.131 The
Tenth Circuit, by contrast, found a First Amendment violation because,
unlike the district court's non-public forum conclusion, it labeled Pioneer

1' S% eg., Brief for the Cities of Casper, Wyoming et al. as Amic Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Pleasant
Grove Cityv. Summum, 129S. Ct 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665), 2008 WL2550620; Brief for the City ofNew York
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Plesant Grve Ci, 129 S. CL 1125 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 2521268;
Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amid Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 1Yasant Grove Cli, 129 S.
Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 2550616.
18 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Lcal Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-46 (1983).

130 SeeSummun v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (10th Cir. 2007),
(2009).
3 See id at 1053-54.

tvd,

129 S. Ct 1125
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Park a traditional public forum.'3 2 Under strict scrutiny, Pleasant Grove
could not show a compelling interest or a narrowly tailored means for
accomplishing its goal.' 33 Neither opinion does terrible violence to forum
law or past precedent. This is not to suggest that forum analysis is a
wonderfill construct, but it has been used for More than a half-century. Its
weaknesses and unfortunate consequences are well known and can be
avoided when necessary.
If, as the district court found, monuments in parks constitute non-public
fora in which the government may limit content, but not viewpoint, 34
individual cases can be decided on whether the particular monument fits
the content limitation and is viewpoint free. Rosenberger and Pery are among
the many examples of the imprecision of "content" and "viewpoint" and the
ability of various Justices to disagree about which label works for any
particular speech.' 35 If, as the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court
preferred, the park is a traditional public forum subject to time, place, and
manner restrictions-no matter the form and permanence of the speechindividual cases can be determined by the extent to which monuments
interfere with the forum's use by others. Either result in Pleasant Grove could
have been accomplished under forum analysis. The analysis would be
subject to the criticism that the Court is misinterpreting the facts or twisting
the doctrine, but virtually all First Amendment decisions draw such
criticisms from those who agree with the losers-in many cases, fourJustices
who were in dissent.
In contrast to forum analysis, government speech was not identified as
an analytic construct until the PleasantGrove decision. In the various musings
about government speech in earlier opinions, which involved no
government speech, there is nothing by way of analysis, cautions, or
boundaries, and there is no understanding of how the existence of a
government-speech doctrine might "affect existing doctrine in ways not yet
explored." 3 6
As set forth in PleasantGrove, the government-speech doctrine creates the
potential for substantial First Amendment mischief.'3 7
The most
monumental mischief allows the government to facilitate private speech by

id at 1050, 1052.
13Se id at 1052.
1s2 S

4

Id at 1052.
Se Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Peny Iocal Educators' As'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
"6 Pleasant Grove City v. Sununurn, 129 S. C. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter,J., concuning).
1' Sa id at 1131 (describing government-speech doctrine).
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those whose viewpoint it approves and deny that facilitation of private
speech to those whose viewpoint it dislikes. The danger in government
sheltering, adopting, or facilitating private speech was not something of
which Justice Alito was unaware: "There may be situations in which it is
difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or
is providing a forum for private speech, but this case does not present such a
situation."' 38
There is no better argument for the danger of a government-speech
doctrine than a judge's failure to see that allowing one religion's privately
contributed monument in a public park, but denying another religion's
privately contributed monument, does not present a situation in which a
government entity is providing a forum for private speech.
Johanns, the decision cited to establish that "[t]he Free Speech
Clause ... does not regulate government speech,"' 39 turned on an
argument that the speaker was the government and not a private party.140
Faced with that problem, most of the Pleasant Grove opinion is an attempt to
prove that "[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property typically
representgovernment speech."141
Lacking prior case authority for the assertion that those monuments
"typically represent government speech," Justice Alito turns for support to
the speech of ancient and modern day rulers:
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public.
Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected statues
of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority and power.
Triumphal arches, columns, and other monuments have been built to
commemorate military victories and sacrifices and other events of civic
importance.... When a government entity arranges for the construction
of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or
instill some feeling in those who see the structure.142
After bringing the history of these Ozymandias-like monuments to the
PleasantGrove case,14 3 Justice Alito observes that neither the Court of Appeals

13 ld at 1132.
19 Id at 1131 (citingJohanns v. Livestock Mkt'g Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) ("Mhe Government's
own speech ... is exempt from irst Amendment senrtiny.")).
140SwJohams, 544 U.S. at 553 ("Mhe dispositive question is whether the generic advertising at issue is the
Government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment senmtiny.").
' 41 PeasantGrove, 129 S. Ct. at 1 132 (emphasis added).
142 Id at 1132-33.
143 See
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nor Summum "disputes the obvious proposition that a monument that is
commissioned and financed by a government body for placement on public
But the monument being
land constitutes government speech."'4+
neither
Ten
Commandments-was
Grove's
justified-Pleasant
145
commissioned by nor financed by the government.
The remainder of the Pleasant Grove opinion attempts to make the case
that privately donated monuments not "commissioned and financed by a
government body" are, nevertheless, government speech, because the
government has adopted the message of the private speech as its own: "It
certainly is not common for property owners to open up their property for
the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with which
they do not wish to be associated."14 6 Citing the Statue of Liberty, the Iwo
Jima Monument, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and other patriotic war
monuments, Justice Alito says that the nation has a history of "selective
receptivity" and that "[t]he monuments that are accepted, therefore, are
meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message,
and they thus constitute government speech."l 47
Summum rested much of its argument on what the opinion conceded
was a "legitimate concern that the government speech doctrine not be used
as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on
viewpoint." 4 8 The argument was dismissed by defining it away, basically
saying that words in stone on public property are government speech.149
"There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
I met a traveller fmm an antique land
Who said Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand
Half sunk a shatter'd visage lies, whose fmwn
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamp'd on these lifeless things,
The hand that mock'd them and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king ofkings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

Id

4
1145
4lImsant Groe, 129 S. Ct. at 1133.
S id at 1129.
6 Id at 1133.
141Id at 1133-34.

18Id at 1134.

14 See id at 1134-37.
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private speech, but this case does not present such a situation. Permanent
monuments displayed on public property typically represent government
speech." 50
Summum next argued that if the monuments in Pioneer Park-the Ten
Commandments, in particular-were to be government speech, Pleasant
Grove should pass a resolution saying so. 151 Justice Alito might have
disposed of the Summum monument problem by saying that Pleasant
Grove had, by its decision to allow the monument, adopted the Ten
Commandments speech as its own, but he did not. He said that if the
decision rested on Pleasant Grove's adoption of the speech as its own, all
governments would have to "go back and proclaim formally that they adopt
15 2
all of these monuments as their own expressive vehicles."
The contention that formal adoptions by governments would be
onerous and a "pointless exercise that the Constitution does not
mandate"' 5 3 seems out of place, since national monuments were not at issue
and no one was claiming that a formal adoption procedure was necessary
for all existing national monuments. But if there was a burgeoning problem
of existing monuments, the Court could have said that all acceptances of
privately commissioned and financed monuments, as with Pleasant Grove's
acceptance of the Ten Commandments, constituted government adoption
of the private speech as its own. The problem with government adoption of
monument speech, which the opinion strove to avoid, was that adoption of
the Ten Commandments by Pleasant Grove would bring the Establishment
Clause into the case in a way that could cause only trouble for the result
sought in the opinion.
In an attempt to avoid the adoption problem, the remainder of the
opinion argues that governments cannot adopt the speech of monuments
because the monument speech has no meaning, and if it does the meaning
changes over time.154 It is here that the opinion loses all coherence. The
argument that it is not reasonable to consider government acceptance of
privately commissioned and funded monuments as a government adoption
of the private speech, because there is no meaning to adopt, is a direct
contradiction of the opinion's core justification for why the government
acceptance of a private speech monument is government speech: "The

oId at 1132.
Ms

Sm id at 1134.

152
Id
153Id
4
15 Smidat1135--37.
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monuments that are accepted . . . are meant to convey and have the effect
of conveying a government message. . " 155
The logic train is extraordinary. 1) Monuments, because they are
funded by the government, are government speech and the government
may say what it wants. 2) Private speech, when its message is adopted by
government, is government speech as much as if the government funded it.
3) The government need not affirm the meaning of a privately donated
monument because a monument has no meaning to convey. 4) If, per
chance, a private monument has a meaning when given to the government,
the meaning evolves into a different meaning. 5) Therefore, since
monuments have no meaning, the government should not be stuck with a
meaning-original or evolved.
The argument is all the more unfortunate because the effect in the case
before the Court is to say that the Ten Commandments had no original
meaning to convey and, even if they did, the meaning had changed. The
problem will not go away if government speech can express a private
viewpoint without adopting it. Most of the future cases that rely upon the
newly minted doctrine are likely to be those involving the government
sanitizing equally controversial private speech by making it government
speech. The "Choose Life" license plate cases are a current example.
Thirty-two years ago, in Wooley v. Maynard,156 the Court struck down a
New Hampshire criminal statute that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly
obscure the letters or figures on any license plate. 5 7 George Maynard
covered up the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die," and was
arrested for violating the statute.' 58 The Court held that the statute violated
the First Amendment. 59 Saying that the Free Speech Clause protects the
individual's right "to hold a point of view different from the majority and to
refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find
morally objectionable," 60 the Court held that the State could not make it a
crime for Maynard to block out the state motto without showing a
compelling government interest.161
Ironically, New Hampshire's
compelling-interest claim, that of "promot[ing] appreciation of history,

55Id at 1134.
56

1

57

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id at 707, 717.

158Id at 707-08.
59

I at 717.
Id
715.

160Id. at

161Id at 716-17.
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individualism, and state pride," 62 was strikingly similar to Pleasant Grove's
claim that the Pioneer Park displays promoted history.163 In rejecting the
New Hampshire claim, the Wooley Court made an important observation
about the government as a speaker: "[W]here the State's interest is to
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest
cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming
the courier for such message."' 64
The license-plate-motto problem began to change when, a decade after
Wooley, Florida issued a plate commemorating the astronauts killed in the
Challenger tragedy. 6 5 Rather than place the commemoration on all license
plates, Florida created a specialty plate that Florida drivers could purchase
for a fee greater than the normal price for Florida plates.166
The license-plate-motto issue became ugly when legislatures decided to
put controversial, ideological messages on license plates and avoided Wooley
by charging private individuals a fee for making their private speech part of
the government's license plate. It did not take long for legislators who
depended upon popular approval for their reelection to pass legislation that
approved some specialty-plate speech, but not others. The legislatures of
Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina thought it politically expedient to
authorize "Choose Life" specialty plates.'6 7 No proposal for "Pro-Choice"
specialty plates was made in Florida or Louisiana. Such a proposal was
made in South Carolina, but it was killed in committee.168 The cases arising
from the initial "Choose Life" push for specialty plates-Hildreth v.
Dickinson,169 Women's Emergency Network v. Bush,170 Henderson v. Stalder,'7' and
Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose' 72-were fought out on issues of
standing, forum analysis, and the nature of the speech. Hildreth and Women's
Emergency Network found that the plaintiffs had no standing. 7 3 In Henderson,

'62Id. at 716.
163See

Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009)
("The only interest Pleasant Grove asserted is an interest in promoting its history.").
164
Wooly, 430 U.S. at 717.
'65SeDivers TaAg
Tags to the Sktt, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fa.),Jan. 7, 1987, at 12B.

GallagW'

166See id
167S gealy Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. §56-3-8000 (2001)); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing L.A.REv. STAT.
ANN. §47:463:61 (2001)); Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *5-6
(M.D. Ha. Dec. 22, 1999) (citing FtA. STAT. § 320.08058(3OXa) (1999)).
168
Se Rose, 361 F.3d at 788.
169 ildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503.
70 Women's Emergency Network v. Bush 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003).
171 Henderson, 287 F.3d 374.
172Rose, 361 F.3d 786.
" Se Bush, 323 F.3d at 947; fITrth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *18-19.
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Louisiana argued that the plaintiffs had no standing and, in any event, that
the plates were government speech.174 The district court rejected both the
standing argument and the government-speech analysis, and said that
whatever the proper forum determination, the government could not
engage in viewpoint discrimination.' 75 However, the Fifth Circuit killed the
case, finding that the plaintiffs had no standing.176
The Rose decision is the most intriguing in light of the Pleasant Grove
creation of a government-speech doctrine that allows viewpoint
discrimination even when the viewpoint is the donor's private speech. The
Rose court said that the specialty license plate mixed private and government
speech, 77 but decided the case by incorporating forum analysis.
Acknowledging that the hybrid message was viewpoint discrimination,' 78 it
held that whether it was permissible depended on both the character of the
speech and the "nature of the medium."' 79 In finding the forum to be even
more limited than the school mailboxes in Pery, it prohibited the viewpoint
discrimination. 80 In language particularly prescient in light of Pleasant
Grove's reliance on the Southworth "political accountability" rationale, the Rose
court said: "The State has opened a limited forum for expression, then
entered that forum as a covert but dominant speaker, advocating for one
viewpoint in the abortion debate without political accountability and
without authorizing the expression of the opposing viewpoint."' 8 '
The Supreme Court denial of certiorari in yet another specialty-licenseplate case just one year after the Pleasant Grove decision is particularly
interesting. 8 2 Choose Life of Illinois v. White involved Illinois' refusal to
approve a "Choose Life" specialty license.'8 3 The State argued in the
Seventh Circuit that it could refuse because the proposed speech was
government speech, not private speech.184 The Seventh Circuit upheld
Illinois' refusal, but rejected the government-speech claim and decided the
4
17
Hadffson, 287 F.3d at 377-78.
'735 Id

" 6 d at 376.
"n Roe, 361 F.3d at 794 ("The State speaks by authorizing the Choose ife plate and creating the message,
all to pmomote the pro-life point of view; the individual speaks by displaying the Choose life plate on her
vehide.").
178& id at 795 ("[The Act was adopted because of the State's agreement with the pro-ife message. South
Camlina has therefore discriminated based on viewpoint.").
79S id at 798 (' conclude that in assessing the Act, a court must focus not only on the character of the
speech, but also the nature of the medium.").
80
Se id at 799.
'82 Sagmeralf Choose Ufe Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008), cat dazid, 130 S. CL 59 (2009).
183 id at 857.
84
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case using forum analysis.185 It said that the license plate was a non-public
forum, but because the subject of abortion was excluded, from any
viewpoint, the discrimination was permissible content discrimination, not
viewpoint discrimination. 8 6 The certiorari denial is the latest in a growing
line of cases in which the Court has turned back an attempt to put a
"Choose Life" license-plate case on its docket. That is unlikely to last
forever. The Court will eventually be forced to see if its newly minted
government-speech doctrine is as broad as PleasantGrove suggests, or if it will
distinguish between words in stone, words on metal, and words in the air.
It seems beyond comprehension that the government should have the
power to endorse private speech about potential legislation by making it
government speech and thereby diminish the value in the political dialogue
of the contrary private speech. Even worse is the notion that government
should be able to endorse private speech about things over which it has no
lawmaking power and thereby diminish the value of contrary private speech
and ideas. Abortion is the current divisive topic over which government
lawmaking competence and incompetence is well established, but
controversial. It will not always be so; there will be other controversial
topics that are beyond the government's lawmaking competence. There
was a time when we thought that the last thing the government could do
was influence whether we pray or honor the faith of a majority of our
citizens.
V. THE "ELEPHANT IN THE RooM"

Pleasant Grove, at least in its potential effect, is not really about
monuments; it is about religion. The monument, after all, was Judaism's
Ten Commandments. Justice Scalia, concurring in Pleasant Grove, said: "[I] t
is also obvious that from the start, the case has been litigated in the shadow
of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause."187 He used his entire
concurrence to explain why future government exhibition and use of the
Ten Commandments will not violate the Establishment Clause. 8 The
great danger from Justice Alito's government-speech doctrine, allowing
government to express a private viewpoint without adopting its meaning, is
that it will facilitate Justice Scalia's view of the Establishment Clause. He
believes that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit "disregard of

'5Id at 863-67.
86Id

at 865.

18Pleasant Grove City v. Sumnmum,
18 Seeid

at 1139-O.

129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139(2009) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the
disregard of devout atheists,"189 and that its guarantee of "free exercise"
means that there is no problem if the "political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in."o90 Bad news for the one in five of our population that does not believe
in any religion' 9' and for those religionists who believe their God created
humankind with a reasoning capacity so it could take care of itself, allowing
the deity to be "unconcerned" about the vagaries of human existence, be
they as tragic as plague or as trivial as whether one team or another prevails
in a game.
Justice Alito did attempt in his Pleasant Grove opinion to assure that the
government-speech doctrine is not without some restraints. He pointed to
religion: "For example, government speech must comport with the
Establishment Clause." 92 But nowhere in his opinion does he explain why
endorsing the Ten Commandments would not constitute a religious
affirmation by the government and therefore be contrary to the
Establishment Clause. Moses, were he with us, would probably be
surprised at the notion that the tablets delivered by his God on Mt. Sinai
were not quintessentially religious-the cornerstone of his religion.
93
Justice Scalia, at least since his opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,'
has been trying to establish that the First Amendment is designed to give
special consideration to majority religions, short shrift to the religious
practices of smaller religions, and no consideration to those who do not
want the state to endorse or finance the majority religion.

In Smith, he took the Court out of protecting the "free exercise" of
minority religious practices by replacing the long-standing strict scrutiny of
laws impinging on those practicesl 94 with minimal scrutiny-the Court's
His assault on the Court's
version of a free pass for legislation.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence began at least as early as his dissent in
Lee v. Weisman,195 where he argued that the First Amendment did not exist to
protect individual rights, but rather, to protect majority rights.' 96 He
claimed that prohibition of prayer at a government function (a high school

18

McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,893 (2005) (Scalia,J., dissenting).

19 Emp't Div. v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872,890 (1990).

91
1 BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN REUGIOUS IDEMIFICATION SURVEY 3 (2009).

S. Ct. at 1132.
'93Jusdce Scalia delivered the opinion for the Court in SmiA. Se Sme , 494 U.S. at 874.
19Sw Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to Free Exercise claim).
19Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
192Planna Gyre, 129

196
Seid at 645-46 (Scalia,J.,
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graduation) violated the Establishment Clause because the purpose of the
Clause was to empower groups of religionists:
Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it
necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people,
and not just as individuals, because they believe in the "protection of
divine Providence," as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for
individuals but for societies; because they believe God to be, as
Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the "Great Lord and
Ruler of Nations." 9 7
On the subject of religion, and the Ten Commandments in particular,
Justice Scalia has said that the specific exclusion from the country's basic
law document, the Constitution, of any reference to God or religion, save
the specific admonition that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,"' 98 is of
little moment.'99 He has not yet attained a majority for his comprehensive
reworking of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, though he came
close in McCreag County v. ACLU. 200
In Van Orden v. Perry, 20' argued at the same time as McCreary County,
Justice Stevens asserted in dissent that "reliance on early religious
statements and proclamations made by the Founders is ... problematic
because those views were not espoused at the Constitutional Convention in
1787 nor enshrined in the Constitution's text." 20 2 In his McCreary County
dissent, Justice Scalia claims that Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamation
and other similar utterances trump the text of the Constitution and show
that the real meaning of the Establishment Clause is not about protecting
individuals-or possibly the states against the federal government-but is a
positive assertion that the government may (should?) endorse the general
belief in God and religion. 20s Faced with the argument that display of the
Ten Commandments is an endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint,
Justice Scalia, who accepts that the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from favoring one religion over another, says that display of the
Ten Commandments "cannot be reasonably understood as a government

9

Id at 645.
U.S. CONsT. art VI, c. 3.
191
20 Se McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,885-94 (2005) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
0 Sm id at 885 ("Justice Scalia, with whom the ChiefJustice and Justice Thomas join, and with whom
Justice Kennedy joins as to Parts II and B, dissenting.").
201 Van Orden v. Pery, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
2o2Id at 724 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
203
McCremy Camy, 545 U.S. at 887-900 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint." 20 He argues that
Judaism's Ten Commandments are part of the country's three most popular
religions and that "it is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices
that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and
believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout
atheists." 205
The government-speech doctrine provides Justice Scalia with another
way to reach the result he could not achieve in McCreary County. After
observing, in his PleasantGrove concurrence, that the city was concerned that
it might be breaching "the so-called 'wall of separation between church and
State,"' 206 he concluded: "The city can safely exhale. Its residents and
visitors can now return to enjoying Pioneer Park's wishing well, its historic
granary-and, yes, even its Ten Commandments monument-without fear
that they are complicit in an establishment of religion." 207
There's the rub. For Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments have lost
their centrality to my father's religion, and, because Christianity adopted
them and is the overwhelming majority religion in the United States, the
Ten Commandments are now merely part of the history of Pleasant Grove,
equal in status with the wishing well and the granary. Roger Williams, who
as early as 1644 recognized that the "wall of separation between the garden
of the church and the wilderness of the world" was needed to protect
religion from being devalued if adopted by the state, 208 must be turning in
his grave. The danger for religion is manifest in justice Scalia's failure to
understand that the centerpiece of the Jewish religion is devalued when it is
reduced to an article of Pleasant Grove's history or commandeered for the
majority religion of the United States. He sees no damage to my father's
religion and its meaning to my father by his official devaluation of that
centerpiece.
The danger from the Pleasant Grove decision is thatJustice Scalia's neveraccepted view that the Establishment Clause is not a protection of an
individual's religious freedom, but rather an enabler for the "desire of a
religious majority," 209 will find new life as "government speech." The

Id at 894 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id at 893.
m Pleasant Grove City v. Summun, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Scalia, J., concuning) (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
07
2 Id at 1140.
20 Se James C. Davis, haduia to ON RELlGIOUS LBERTY: SELECHONS FROM THE WORKS OF
ROGER WIUAMS 1,1 (James C. Davis ed., 2008).
m Lee v. Weismni, 505 U.S. 577,646 (1992) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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Lord's Prayer, Christ as the savior of the world, and the cross as the
universal mark of religious reverence are no different than the Ten
Commandments in terms of their place in the history of the United States
and in the beliefs of the country's majority religion. Justice Scalia defines
that majority religion in McCreag County as "Christianity, Judaism and
Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all believers," 210 but his
majority religion is, in fact, Christianity, which makes up 97.7% of his three
religion "majority."2 1' Judaism and Islam are merely protective cover.
Whatever logic there is in saying that the Ten Commandments belong
in Pioneer Park because the government can express a viewpoint without
offending the Free Speech Clause will apply equally to a monument
containing the Lord's Prayer, a statue of the Christian savior, or a large
cross. Lest that seems a stretch, considerJustice Scalia's remarks during the
Supreme Court argument in Salazar v. Buono:
JUSTICE SCALIA: The cross doesn't honor non-Christians who
fought in the war? Is that-is thatMR. ELIASBERG: I believe that's actually correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Where does it say that?
MR. ELLASBERG: It doesn't say that, but a cross is the predominant
symbol of Christianity and it signifies that Jesus is the son of God and died
to redeem mankind for our sins, and I believe that's why the Jewish war
veteransJUSTICE SCALIA: It's erected as a war memorial. I assume it is
erected in honor of all of the war dead. It's the-the cross is the-is the
most common symbol of-of-of the resting place of the dead, and it
doesn't seem to me-what would you have them erect? A cross-some
conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you know, a Moslem half
moon and star?
MR. ELIASBERG: Well,Justice Scalia, if I may go to your first point.
The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I
have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a

Jew.
(Laughter.)

21oMcCray Cny., 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
2"Se KoSMIN & KEYSAR,wpra note 191, at 5.
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MR. ELIASBERG: So it is the most common symbol to honor
Christians.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think you can leap from that to the
conclusion that the only war dead that that cross honors are the Christian
war dead. I think that's an outrageous conclusion.
MR. ELIASBERG: Well, my-the point of my-point here is to say
that there is a reason the Jewish war veterans came in and said we don't
feel honored by this cross. This cross can't honor us because it is a
religious symbol of another religion. 212
It is hard to imagine how, for Justice Scalia, any Christian symbol or
prayer is not equal to the Ten Commandments in its position as a
representation of the majority religion. As such, those symbols could not,
any more than a display of the Ten Commandments, "be reasonably
understood as a government endorsement of a particular religious
viewpoint."2 13
Allowing the government to promote the Ten Commandments, or any
other religious idea, is the quintessential example of promoting speech
about something over which the government has no power. Justice Scalia's
notion that "there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion
generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in
a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments" 214 could
not gain a majority even in Van Orden, where the Court did not require the
removal of the Ten Commandments. It might be true, as Justice Douglas
said in Zorach v. Clauson,215 that "[w]e are a religious people," 2 16 but there are
not yet five votes for becoming a religious country.
There is a danger that Pleasant Grove's unleashing of the government's
tongue in the public dialogue on matters over which it has no lawmaking
power will begin leading us in the direction of being a religious country.
Nothing could be more antithetical to the core idea of the First
Amendment. It allows the government to boost the private belief and
speech of some, and diminish the private belief and speech of those who
disagree, about a topic over which the government should have no influence
because it has no power.
2

Trasript ofOral Argument at 35-36, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08472).

' McCaMVy Gy., 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia,J., dissentng.
MVan Orden v. Peny, 545 U.S. 677,692 (2005) (ScaliaJ., concuning).
215Zorach v. Causon, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
6 Id at 313.
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Nothing is more likely to cause unnecessary strife within a society, and
cause some to feel that they do not belong, than when that expressed
government viewpoint is about religion. Religion is a subject about which
the long history of humankind shows mostly war, persecution, and death.
Ask the early Christians of Rome; ask the Jews of the Middle Ages; ask the
Catholics of the mid-nineteenth century United States; ask any religious
minority located where the government can express a viewpoint about
religion-even if characterized as part and parcel of the nation's history and
culture. Ask the Pilgrims and the Puritans. Ask any minority sect in the
Middle East.
There was a time when we thought that the last thing the government
could do was influence whether we pray or honor the faith of a majority of
our citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
What separates Pleasant Grove's government-speech doctrine from any
case cited in its support-and what makes it particularly dangerous-is that
it allows the government to express a viewpoint about matters that are
unrelated to its lawmaking power. The "individual self-fulfillment" theory
of free speech as articulated by Professor Emerson carries an important
implication about the difference between action and speech, explaining why
a government-speech doctrine that allows the government to express a
viewpoint beyond its power to make law is foreign to any First Amendment
value:
[TJhe theory rests upon a fundamental distinction between belief, opinion
and communication of ideas on the one hand, and different forms of
For shorthand purposes we refer to this
conduct on the other.
distinction ... as one between "expression" and "action." ... [I] n order to
achieve its desired goals, a society or the state is entitled to exercise control
over action-whether by prohibiting or compelling it-on an entirely
different and vastly more extensive basis. But expression occupies a
specially protected position. In this sector of human conduct, the social
right of suppression or compulsion is at its lowest point, in most respects
non-existent. 217
In accord with the notion that action and speech are separate spheres, it
seemed axiomatic from the text of the Constitution and from all of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence before Pleasant Grove that the government's

217
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role in society is to make law. Even Johanns, which on its face seemed to be
a gratuitous government promotion of private speech, was related to the
government's ability to legislate in favor of beef consumption as a part of a
government program permitted under the Commerce Clause. Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, which saw no government-speech rationale,
was based on her belief "that the assessments in these cases, as in United
States v. United Foods, Inc.. . . qualify as permissible economic regulation."2 18
It should have been equally axiomatic, at least before Pleasant Grove, that
if the government had no power to make law on a subject, it had no power
to convey a message on the subject. It is important to distinguish between
speech by the entity of government and those who are in or aspire to be a
part of the government. No government-speech doctrine is needed to
enable government officials to speak their minds on any issue, so long as
they are speaking in their individual capacities as office holders, politicians,
or citizens. The Free Speech Clause protects that speech.
The government-speech doctrine of Pleasant Grove applies to
government as government. Consider two obvious examples. The
government cannot have either a program or a policy against a woman's
right to choose termination of pregnancy during the first trimester.
Similarly, it cannot have a program or policy that schools should be
segregated based on race. It boggles the mind to think that a "government
speech" doctrine would allow the government to pay for an advertisement
that said: "Abortion, no matter when, is murder;" or one that said: "Move
to a school district with no minority families so that your children may
attend an all-white school!" Any office holder, politician, or political party
for that matter, as individuals or as a group of individuals, could say such
things if so inclined, and that right would be protected by the First
Amendment.
At least for now, the government cannot subsidize the celebration of the
birth of Christ without the proper portions of plastic reindeer and fat elves
in red suits. 219 And before Pleasant Grove, it would have been obvious that
the government could not pay for an advertisement that said "Celebrate
Christmas with your family!" After Pleasant Grove gave the government the
power to offer a viewpoint in an area in which it had no power to make law,
it is not so obvious.

218 Johanns
omitted).
9

v. livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 570 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concuring) (citations
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Pleasant Grove's characterization of the Ten Commandments as nonreligious when displayed next to a wishing well and a granary is no different
from the Lynch v. Donnelly decision that the cr6che was non-religious when
displayed next to a plastic reindeer and a Santa Claus. 220 It is hard to
imagine how the government speech in an advertisement that said
"Celebrate Christmas with your family" would be any more religious than
the non-religious reindeer and Santa Claus guarded creche. The Pleasant
Grove opinion attempts to persuade that the government-speech doctrine
that permits the Ten Commandments monument in Pioneer Park is
justified by a Free Speech distinction between words on stone and words in
the air, 22' but there is nothing in the explanation of the government-speech
doctrine that limits the government's thoughts and words to those written in
stone. And if that is the distinction, does that mean that Pleasant Grove
could put a permanent reindeer-cr6che-Santa Claus stone monument in
Pioneer Park?
The government-speech doctrine is counterfeit. Government needs no
government-speech doctrine to speak in support of its laws and policies.
Government has the power of conduct in making, interpreting, and
facilitating its laws. Government speech in support of its conduct may be
considered part of that government conduct in the same way that, for First
Amendment purposes, an individual's expressive conduct can be considered
part of that individual's protected speech. If government wants to promote
tourism or its products, discourage the health hazard of cigarette smoking,
or urge its form of government on the rest of the world, it is clearly within its
various constitutional powers and obligations. If the government speech is
an adjunct to its power of conduct, the constitutionality of that speech
should be tested in the same way that the constitutionality of the
government conduct would be tested. If the government speech is not in
pursuit of something over which it has the power of conduct, the
government has no power of speech. Government needs no special
doctrine to memorialize its victories, its defeats, or its heroes in order to
erect monuments to them on its own property.

m See id at 671, 687.
22 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137 (2009) ("Respondent and the Court of
Appeals analogize the installation of permanent monuments in a public park to the delivery of speeches and the
holding of marches and demonstrations, and they thus invoke the nle that a public park is a traditional public
fonm for these activities. But 'public forum principles .. .are out of place in the context of this case."' (quoting
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194,205 (2003)) (alteration in original)).

